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Abstract
Persistent gender gaps in political officeholding and mass political 
participation jeopardize women’s equal representation in government. This 
paper brings new evidence to the longstanding hypotheses that the presence
of additional female candidates and officeholders helps address these gaps 
by empowering other women to vote or run for office themselves. With a 
regression discontinuity approach and data on 3,813 US state legislative 
elections where a woman opposed a man, I find that the election of 
additional women in competitive US state legislative elections has no 
discernible causal effects on other women’s political participation at the 
mass or elite levels. These estimates are precise enough to rule out even 
substantively small effects. These estimates stand in stark contrast to a 
number of similar findings from India, suggesting that although electing the 
first women in a society can have these empowering effects, remaining 
barriers to women’s inclusion in American democracy go beyond what 
further increases in female officeholding can themselves erode.
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Less than one hundred years ago, women in the United States were 
denied the right to vote in federal elections and no women held federal 
office. Today, it is commonplace for more women than men to cast ballots in 
US Presidential elections, while thousands of women hold significant political 
offices in the US. Nevertheless, despite the remarkable progress in women’s 
political inclusion that has been made over the last century, large gender 
gaps in American politics remain (e.g., Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 
ch. 8): women are markedly less likely than men to contact their elected 
officials, to affiliate with political organizations and, most starkly of all, to run
for and serve in elected offices (e.g., CAWP 2010).
Such gender gaps in political participation have significant 
consequences: at the mass level, who participates in politics greatly 
determines who receives substantive representation in government (e.g., 
Griffin and Newman 2005); and at the elite level, female politicians are 
significantly more likely to provide women with substantive representation 
than are their male counterparts (e.g., Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004).
A number of activists, policymakers, and scholars have posited that the
election of more individual women to office and the presence of more female
candidates on ballots holds crucial promise to help close gender gaps in 
participation (see Dolan 2006a and next section for review). Specifically, 
female candidacies and officeholding have long been argued both to 
increase political empowerment among women in the mass public, leading 
more women to vote, and to demonstrate to political elites, voters, and 
women themselves what women can accomplish in office, leading more 
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women to run. Recent findings from India’s unique policy experiments have 
crucially bolstered these arguments by demonstrating that the election of 
women there dramatically increases other women’s political participation in 
the mass public and presence in office (e.g., Beaman et al. 2009; Bhavnani 
2009; Bhalotra et al. 2013; Deininger et al. 2013). Thus, as Dolan (2006a) 
reviews, a large and still-growing body of work suggests that “women 
candidates…send[] the signal that politics is no longer an exclusive man’s 
world,” thereby “stimulat[ing women’s] activity and engagement” at the 
mass and elite levels.
This paper presents new evidence that casts doubt on this view with an
empirical approach that is able to assess the causal impact of female 
officeholding and candidacies in the United States with greater precision and 
less bias than previous work has been able. Specifically, I employ a 
regression discontinuity approach and data describing 3,813 US state 
legislative elections where a woman opposed a man to estimate the causal 
effects of the election of female officeholders and the presence of additional 
women on ballots.
This dataset and research design have several novel advantages over 
previous work. First, although previous work has struggled with teasing apart
the causal impact of electing women from the pre-existing characteristics of 
the places that tend to elect women, I use a quasi-experimental design to 
identify the causal effects of women’s presence on ballots and in office. In 
examining women’s candidacies for state legislative office, I also focus on 
the most crucial training ground for future statewide and federal 
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officeholders and where much systematic bias against women holding office 
first begins (Maestas et al. 2006). This is also the same level of government 
where substantial effects have often been found in India, allowing for a 
meaningful cross-national comparison to be conducted. Moreover, while 
women are just as likely to know who their state legislators are as they are 
their Member of Congress (Burns et al. 2001, p. 102), the state legislative 
level features uniquely plentiful data and variation, allowing for statistically 
precise estimates that could uncover even subtle effects. Last, the nature of 
the regression discontinuity design estimates the effect of women’s victories 
in the most competitive contests, precisely where prevailing theories predict 
the largest effects.
The results cast doubt on the propositions that one woman’s election 
causes other women in her district to vote or women in nearby districts to 
run or win office. First, in other districts nearby districts where women have 
won the previous election, other women are no more likely to run for office 
or be elected. Moreover, women who are represented by a woman instead of
a man or who have the opportunity to vote for a woman at the polls are no 
more likely to turn out to vote as a consequence. The precision of these null 
estimates is considerable enough to rule out even substantively small 
effects: the mobilizing effect of being represented by a woman instead of a 
man on women’s voter turnout is statistically zero and, at most, smaller than
the one percentage point turnout increase yielded from simple GOTV 
postcards. Likewise, the effect of a woman’s victory on the probability that 
other women run for similar offices in their area is, at most, more than an 
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order of magnitude smaller than the effect of a woman being asked to run 
for office by party leaders. Sorting around the discontinuity cannot account 
for these patterns, which are also robust across a number of specifications 
and to a number of alternative explanations.
The results shed new light on the remaining barriers women face to 
equal representation in American politics, both in the electorate and in 
elected office. Even as a bevy of promising new results from India suggest 
that the election of women can sometimes have strong empowering effects 
in contexts where few women have held office before, electing additional 
individual women in the United States appears unable to itself break down 
the underlying barriers to equal representation in government that American
women face.
Do  Female  Politicians  and  Candidates  Empower  Women  To
Participate In Politics?
Women’s political participation continues to fall behind men’s in the 
United States in important respects. In the mass public, women are 
significantly less likely than men to contact their elected officials, contribute 
to political campaigns, and affiliate with political organizations (among other 
political acts), patterns that have clear and widely appreciated implications 
for women’s political equality (e.g., Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, p. 
254). Among the ranks of elected officeholders, women’s 
underrepresentation is even starker: as of 2012, only 17% of US Senators 
and 17% Members of the US House are women. These gaps in women’s 
office-holding likewise have clear consequences for women’s equal 
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substantive representation: female legislators are more likely to sponsor and
vote for women’s interest legislation (e.g., Gertzog 1995; Niven 1998; 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004), and women have more positive evaluations 
of their female representatives (Lawless 2004).1
The Empowering Potential of Female Officeholders and Candidates?
Seeking to understand how persistent inequalities in women’s political 
voice can be addressed, scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to 
understanding the roots of women’s underrepresentation in the mass public 
and among elected officeholders (see Dolan 2006a for review). One novel 
hypothesis about how to increase women’s participation has gained 
particular prominence: that the election of female officeholders and the 
presence of female candidates on ballots itself causes more women to 
politically participate, both in more routine acts of participation in the mass 
public (such as contacting one’s representatives) and by running for elected 
office themselves.
At the mass level, scholars have long argued that historically 
underrepresented groups like women will participate in politics to a greater 
extent when they have descriptive representatives (e.g., Banducci, Donovan,
and Karp 2004; Beaman et al. 2012; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Gay 2002; 
Mansbridge 1999; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Williams 1998).2 Supporting 
such expectations, a large empirical literature has uncovered correlations 
between the presence of women on ballots and in government with many 
1 Women’s growing representation has more general consequences, as well: because 
barriers to entry for political office are higher for women than for men, the women who do 
enter politics are generally more talented than are men (Anzia and Berry 2011).
2 See also Harris, Sinclair-Chapman, and McKenzie (2005, 2006), Washington (2006), and 
Broockman (2013).
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aspects of women’s political participation (e.g., Burns et al. 2001; Atkeson 
2003; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2006, 2007; Karp and Banducci 2008; 
Atkeson and Carrillo 2007; Reingold and Harrell 2010).
Scholars have also noted several compelling reasons to expect the 
election of one female politician or the presence of a competitive female 
candidate to ‘break a glass ceiling’ and lead to more participation at the elite
level in the form of other women’s candidacies or elections. First, party elites
who witness women in prominent political roles are expected to decrease 
their well-documented biases against female candidates as a result of 
witnessing women vying for, winning, and holding office (e.g., Beaman et al. 
2009; Bhavnani 2009; see also Niven 1998; Sanbonmatsu 2006).3 In addition,
just as women who might run for office have been found to often 
“underestimate” their own “qualifications to seek and win elective office” or 
to have absorbed sexist ideas about the role of women in the political sphere
(Lawless and Fox 2005, 2011), this internalized sexism is hypothesized to 
diminish when women see other women holding office through a ‘role model’
process (e.g., Schramm 1981; Gilardi 2013). Both expectations are 
consistent with work in psychology suggesting that mere exposure to female 
leaders can reduce sexism and increase women’s own expectations to their 
group (e.g., Dasgupta and Asgari 2004) and with results from American 
politics suggesting that political elites learn from and seek to duplicate their 
strategies after winning close elections (e.g., Martin and Peskowitz 2013; 
3 64% of female local officeholders reported to Niven (1998) that “party leaders 
discouraged” them from running for office “because of their gender” and a substantial share
of party leaders report believing that women are less electorally viable and less qualified to 
hold office than are men (Niven 1998; Sanbonmatsu 2006; see also Lawless and Fox 2005, 
2010).
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Brooks and Henderson 2013).4
Pathbreaking findings from India’s unique policy experiments have 
recently granted further support to these expectations (Beaman et al. 2009; 
Bhavnani 2009; Deininger et al. 2013; Beaman et al. 2012). For example, 
Deininger et al. (2013) find that women in these reserved districts are 
significantly more likely to participate in politics in a variety of ways, and 
Bhalotra et al. (2013) demonstrate that women’s electoral victories in India 
make the political environment more hospitable for female candidates in 
subsequent elections.5
Are There Limits To Women’s Empowering Potential?
Despite the compelling evidence that the election of women to local 
and regional political bodies empowers women to participate in politics at 
the mass and elite levels in India, there are good theoretical reasons to 
doubt that the election of additional women or the presence of additional 
female candidates would do so in a country like the US. Specifically, though 
the first women to hold office in the United States may have once had 
similarly large effects on women’s political participation and officeholding as 
are women in India today, female officeholding is now commonplace enough 
in the United States that the empowering gains from female descriptive 
representation may have been largely realized; unlike most Indians, most 
Americans are already familiar with a number of local and prominent female 
4 In addition, although many voters appear to apply sexist stereotypes (e.g. Koch 2000), 
voters also appear to diminish their biases against female candidates as a result of 
witnessing a woman hold office (e.g., MacManus 1981; Beaman et al. 2009; Bhavnani 2009; 
Healy 2013).
5 Findings from India are not unambiguous, however; some papers do find null results for 
some outcomes (e.g., Bhalotra et al. 2013), even though the balance of the literature still 
suggests the existence of these empowering effects.
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politicians. In the context of the male-dominated US Senate, for example, 
voters, elites, and women might change their gender views very little in 
reaction to the election of hypothetical new 18th female Senator (there are 
currently 17), even if the election of the first female US Senator (Hattie 
Caraway, in 1931) did have large effects in mobilizing women to vote or in 
showcasing women’s true potential to other women thinking about running 
for office, voters, and party leaders.
Supporting the notion that the empowering effects of female 
officeholding may diminish after the first cohort of pathbreaking female role 
models are elected, Gilardi (2013) finds that the first women who run for 
office in Swiss municipalities do generate spillovers that lead other women to
run in nearby other areas, but that this effect erodes as further women are 
elected.6 Consistent with such doubts, several studies have also found no 
association between female officeholding or candidacies and women’s 
political participation in the United States (Haynes 1997; Lawless 2004; 
Dolan 2006b).
Deeper barriers to women’s participation in American politics may 
persist that go beyond what the election of additional female officeholders 
can further erode (Duflo 2012), such as culturally ingrained sexist ideas 
about leadership, deep-seated sexist views among party leaders and other 
political gatekeepers, and gender gaps in access to other resources, patterns
that scholars have all documented have important effects on women’s 
participation (see Dolan 2006a for review, and also Arceneaux 2001; Gneezy,
6 Gilardi (2013) also provides a number of qualitative interviews consistent with this 
mechanism.
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Leonard, and List 2009).
Methodological Challenges
Despite the substantive importance and continuing scholarly debate on
the empowering effects of female officeholders, few studies have 
persuasively identified the causal effect of women’s candidacies or 
officeholding on women’s mass and elite-level participation in the US. 
Empirically addressing these effects has proven challenging for two main 
reasons.
First, most existing work (e.g., Ferreira and Gyourko 2013) has 
contended with limited data: the relatively small number of countries that 
have significant female representation has limited cross-country 
comparisons, and the continuing scarcity of female representatives at many 
levels of government has limited cross-district approaches as well. Data on 
women’s voter turnout is also difficult to gather in many areas, further 
limiting research.
Selection bias has proven a second persistent challenge. As scholars 
do not yet fully understand the reasons why women are elected in the places
that they are, associations between a woman’s candidacy or election in one 
district and the outcomes of interest (e.g, Healy 2013) are difficult to 
convincingly tease apart because we cannot be sure that that all potentially 
confounding factors have been controlled for. Although scholars have found 
experimental evidence that female politicians have changed perceptions 
about women’s candidacies in the context of particular case studies and in 
the lab (MacManus 1981; Gitelson and Gitelson 1981), the difficulty in 
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identifying causal relationships between these intertwined phenomenon has 
limited the development of research that has been able to make strong 
causal claims. Supporting these methodological concerns, recent work 
reexamining the impacts of electing African-Americans to local and state 
legislative offices has found that strictly observational designs may overstate
the causal effects of descriptive representation on participation (Hopkins and
McCabe 2013; Henderson, Sekhon, and Titiunik 2013).
In the next section I describe how a quasi-experimental design can 
shed light on this longstanding question by identifying the effect of additional
female officeholding in the US on other women’s participation at the mass 
and elite levels.
Methodology
Research Design
Although the United States does not feature randomized reservation 
systems that would allow for straightforward identification of the causal 
effect of women’s service and candidacies (as is possible in India), a quasi-
experimental approach is available: a regression discontinuity design. 
Regression discontinuity designs have grown increasingly common in 
political science and economics and have been applied to identify causal 
effects in a wide variety of contexts where traditional approaches have 
difficulty (e.g., Lee 2008; Trounstine 2011; see Caughey and Sekhon 2011 for
review). RDDs can estimate the causal effect of a treatment of interest when 
it is determined at a sharp discontinuity in another variable: for example, Lee
(2008) finds that Democrats who “just win” Congressional elections receive a
11
substantial increase in their vote shares in subsequent elections over those 
who have “just lost” the previous election (the incumbency effect). (For more
on RDDs and for a formal proof of their properties, see Lee (2008).)
In this context, I use the discontinuity at the 50% point in the vote 
share garnered by women running in contests against men to identify the 
causal effects of women’s victories. That is, I compare subsequent patterns 
of mass and elite participation in and near districts where women either “just
won” and “just lost” elections against men to test whether other women are 
more likely (1) to vote in subsequent elections when a woman has just won 
the previous election (the mass empowerment hypothesis) or (2) to run for 
or win office in other districts nearby districts where a woman has just won 
the previous election.
Importantly, as some literature identifies female candidates as the 
crucial mobilizing force and not female politicians, I also show that this 
regression discontinuity approach in fact identifies both effects: because 
districts where a woman has just won the previous election are also 
dramatically more likely to have a female candidate in the next election 
(because the woman who won usually runs for re-election), this approach 
identifies the combined causal effect both of the presence of a female 
incumbent and of the resulting increased likelihood that a female candidate 
runs.7
To illustrate how the discontinuity design identifies the effects of 
women’s officeholding, Figure 1 summarizes how it would uncover a 
7 Though this is a weakness of the approach for disentangling the causal effects of female 
officeholding and candidacy were they to exist, the null effects I find could only conceal a 
positive effect of one of these variables if there were in fact a large negative causal effect of 
the other.
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“breaking of the glass ceiling” phenomenon whereby one woman’s victory 
caused other women to be more likely to run for office in other districts in 
her area. The X-axis in Figure 1 refers to the vote share a female candidate 
received in an election against a man in District A at Time 1. The Y-axis 
refers to the number of female candidates who run for or win office in other 
districts near District A at Time 2. As depicted in Figure 1, a man won all 
elections at Time 1 in Figure 1 to the left of the vertical dotted line, 
corresponding to areas where a woman’s two-candidate vote share was 
below 50%; above 50% in two-candidate vote share, and to the right of the 
vertical dotted line, women won all races against men at Time 1. Although 
the sorts of districts that women tend to win and lose are endogenous, 
confounding factors are unlikely to systematically differ just at the 
discontinuity. This means that women’s victories can be considered quasi-
randomly assigned at the discontinuity (Lee 2008) and thus differences in 
subsequent patterns across the discontinuity can be causally attributed to 
the election of a woman in District A. That is, any ‘jump’ in the dependent 
variable at the discontinuity can be attributed to the effect of crossing the 
discontinuity (i.e., of a women winning in District A) because there should be 
no systematic differences between the kinds of districts where women 
happen to have “just won” or “just lost” contests against men.8
In summary, the design compares two groups of districts – one where 
women are both serving in office at the time of the next election (and, as a 
consequence, are also usually on the ballot as well), and another where men 
8 Note that the data are specified at the level of randomization to accurately estimate the 
statistical uncertainty associated with the estimates (e.g., Green et al. 2001).
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serve instead – that are quasi-randomly assigned to these conditions (Lee 
2008). All factors that might be thought to be relevant to women’s 
participation are hence naturally held constant, with no need for additional 
controls (see Green et al. 2009 for a validation of this quasi-experimental 
property of RDDs).
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
In addition to being able to isolate the causal impact of female 
candidacies and officeholding, the regression discontinuity approach also has
the unique characteristic that it specifically identifies the effect of women’s 
victories in very competitive races (i.e., those where a person of the opposite
gender almost won). Although this is a real limitation of regression 
discontinuity approaches, it is in these very close elections that scholars 
have traditionally expected the empowering effects of female descriptive 
representatives to be greatest (e.g., Burns et al. 2001). First, it is to these 
elections that voters and elite political observers alike generally pay the 
closest attention; thus Atkeson (2003) argues that it is the presence of 
female candidates in the most competitive elections who are most strongly 
associated with increase female participation. Elites and women considering 
running for office might thus be expected to glean the most about women’s 
abilities to win such elections as well, and voters can be expected to be most
acquainted with who is running for office in competitive elections as a result 
of greater cognitive engagement, media coverage, campaign 
communication, etc. (e.g., Kam and Utych 2011). Elites concerned about 
women’s abilities to compete in close elections might likewise glean most 
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from watching women’s performance in these races (e.g., Martin and 
Peskowitz 2013). In summary, although the RD approach is restricted in its 
generalizability to a smaller set of cases, it is precisely these cases where 
existing theoretical work typically predicts the effects would be likeliest to 
materialize.9
With plentiful data, the ability to identify causal effects under minimal 
assumptions, and a unique focus on very competitive and engaging 
elections, the design therefore has an excellent chance to detect any 
empowering effects of female descriptive representation and candidacies for 
other women’s mass participation or officeseeking in US state legislative 
elections. Moreover, women are just as likely to know who their state 
legislators are as they are their Members of Congress (Burns et al. 2001, p. 
102), suggesting that the statistical precision available at the state level also
comes with a relatively strong degree of external validity. The results surely 
cannot unambiguously speak to the effect of electing women at other levels 
of government or in other kinds of elections, but close state legislative 
elections are much more salient to female voters than one might expect.
Data
Requisite data to explore these questions came from several sources.
Female Candidates. First, the Center on American Women and Politics 
(CAWP) at Rutgers University collects and graciously makes available data on
all female candidates for state legislature since 1999. In order to conduct the
9 One countervailing expectation may be that rational elites will not learn from women’s 
close victories or close defeats precisely because these elections are decided quasi-
randomly. However, empirical work suggests that even highly strategic American political 
elites do attempt to learn from close wins and losses in shaping future strategies and 
resource allocation decisions (Martin and Peskowitz 2013).
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regression discontinuity on observations where either a woman or a man 
might have won office, I first dropped all cases where a woman ran against 
another woman or a woman ran unopposed. I also restricted the data to 
races that occur in even-numbered years, since data on women’s voter 
turnout for odd-numbered election years was not readily available.10 I finally 
dropped all legislative chambers where there are multi-member districts 
since specifying a regression discontinuity is not straightforward in a multi-
candidate race. This yields a dataset of 3,813 state legislative elections 
where a woman opposed a man in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008. (The years 
2000 and 2010 are excluded because redistricting of between 2000/2010 
and 2002/2012.)
Election Returns. Second, I matched these data to data on state 
legislative election returns gathered from state legislative websites. The 
resulting dataset describes the vote share garnered by the female candidate 
and the male candidate in each of the 3,813 races.
Dependent Variable I: Women’s Candidacies In Nearby Districts. In 
order to assess the effects of a woman’s election in one district on conditions
for female candidates in nearby districts in subsequent elections, I matched 
the election return and CAWP data to data from the US Census that describe 
the geographic location and boundaries of state legislative districts. These 
geographic boundary files allow me to identify other districts ‘nearby’ each 
of the 3,813 main districts and thus where elites and potential female 
candidates might learn of women’s electoral victories and ultimately witness 
10 This excludes Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Virginia, who hold state legislative 
elections in odd-numbered years (e.g., 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009) instead of even-
numbered years.
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women serving in office.
To measure which districts were ‘nearby’ or ‘in the area of’ each other 
district, and thus where elites and women themselves might plausibly 
observe and interact with a female officeholder, I first created a dataset 
describing the distance between each of the 6,652 state legislative districts 
in the US and every other district (describing roughly 66522/2 ≈ 22 million 
unique district pairings). There are multiple ways to express the distance 
between two two-dimensional objects: I chose to do so with the common and
simple method of comparing the distances between the centroids (that is, 
the geographic ‘average location’ or ‘center of gravity’) of each of the 
districts. Figure 2 shows an example of how this procedure, executed using 
ArcGIS, determined which state legislative districts were within 50 miles of 
the state house district for San Francisco, California. In the Figure, the 
centroid of the San Francisco district is denoted by the dark black dot, with 
the large gray circle corresponding to the area within 50 miles of this 
centroid. Ten other state house district centroids fall within this area, 
corresponding to the ten shaded districts that are therefore considered to be
‘within 50 miles’ of the San Francisco district. Other districts with centroids 
beyond the shaded area are thus not considered to be ‘within 50 miles’ of 
the San Francisco district.11
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
To construct the final dependent variable for this spillover analysis, I 
matched this linked distance data with the datasets describing every state 
11 In the next section I show that the results are robust to a number of different district-to-
district distance algorithms.
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legislative election since 2002 and the data on female candidates from 
CAWP, yielding an indicator variable for whether a woman was a candidate in
or won every state legislative election since 2002. I then computed the total 
number of contests and the total number of female candidates and victors in 
those contests in other districts within an arbitrary distance of each district 
to calculate the final dependent variables. (The next section formalizes the 
calculation of this variable.)
Dependent Variable II: Women’s Voter Turnout. To measure women’s 
voter turnout behavior, I purchased data from Catalist, a well-known voter 
data clearinghouse. Catalist provided me with data on the total number of 
votes cast in the general election and the number of votes cast by women in 
every even-numbered election year between 2000 and 2010 from their 
comprehensive US voter files. This dataset yielded two variables of interest 
in each election: dividing the number of votes women cast by the total 
number of votes yields the share of the electorate which women comprised, 
and dividing the number of votes cast by women by the female population 
yields women’s voter turnout.
Does Electing Women Empower Other Women To Vote?
Specifying The RD
To specify the regression discontinuity, I employed the standard 
approach of estimating a function on each side of the discontinuity and then 
estimating the difference between these functions at the discontinuity (Lee 
2008). General practice for doing so is employing a high-order polynomial on 
each side of the discontinuity or using local linear regression (Imbens and 
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Lemieux 2008); I present the results using both approaches.
The model for the hypothesis that the election of a woman in one 
district causes other women in that district to vote therefore takes the 
following form: 
FemaleVotersiå
Womenå i
=a +b1Vi +b2V2i +b3V3i +b4V4i +gFi +b5ViFi +b6V2iFi +b7V3iFi +b8V4iFi +ei
 (1)  
where the left hand side of the equation describes women’s voter 
turnout in district i at Time 2 (with Time 2 defined as whenever the next 
election takes place in district i), α is a constant, Vi is the Woman’s Two-
Candidate Vote Share within district i at Time 1, Fi is a dummy variable set to
1 if Vi > ½ (that is, if the woman wins in i at Time 1) and 0 otherwise, and εi 
is the error term. γ is the coefficient of interest that captures the causal 
effect of a woman’s prior victory on the dependent variable.12
The choice of ‘bandwidth’, or how far from the discontinuity to use 
data for estimating the functions’ values at the limit, presents a tradeoff 
between variance and bias. Narrower bandwidths use fewer observations, 
limiting the estimation procedure to information on observations most 
similar to the exogenous elections right at the limit, but also with lesser 
precision. Conversely, wider bandwidths estimate the model using a greater 
number of observations by including those that are further from the 
discontinuity. In the text I present estimates for a 15 percentage point 
bandwidth, though Table A1 in the Appendix shows that the results for a 
variety of other bandwidths are essentially identical. This 15 percentage 
12 See Imbens and Liemieux (2008) for technical details on the local linear regression 
estimator.
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point figure means that only elections where a female candidate garnered 
between 35% and 65% of the final two-candidate vote are included in the 
estimation procedure.
The polynomial specifications are computed with robust standard 
errors; the Imbens and Liemieux (2008) results are computed using their 
standard error algorithms.
Women Do Appear on the Ballot More Frequently After Winning The Previous 
Election
As some literature attributes the effects of female descriptive 
representation to women’s candidacies in competitive elections, not 
women’s actual presence in office, I first demonstrate that the discontinuity 
in whether a woman wins an election at Time 1 has a strong effect on 
whether a women is a candidate at Time 2. In this way, the discontinuity can 
also be considered an exogenous instrument for women’s presence on the 
ballot in the next election (Broockman 2009): because most candidates who 
win their elections run for re-election, women are (exogenously) much more 
likely to be candidates for election at Time 2 when a woman has just won at 
Time 1. The first and second columns of Table 1 and Panel (c) of Figure 3 
thus show that when a woman just wins an election, a woman is about twice 
as likely to be a candidate in a subsequent election in the same district 
(namely, in most cases, that same woman running for re-election). The 
effects I estimate thus capture the combined effect of women’s incumbency 
and resulting greatly increased likelihood of candidacy (as an increase in the 
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former directly leads to an increase in the latter).13
Do Female Candidates and Politicians Mobilize Women To Vote?
Does the election of a woman or the presence of a woman on the ballot
in the US cause other women to vote? The third and fourth columns of Table 
1 present the estimates for the effect of electing a woman in a district on 
women’s voter turnout in that district in the next election (that is,
P(Voted|Woman)) and the last two columns estimate the effect of a woman’s 
victory on the proportion of voters who are women in that district in the next 
election ( P(Woman|Voted)). In each case, the line in bold represents the 
estimate of γ in equation (1), the causal effect of the election of a woman on 
the dependent variable. The coefficients on the polynomials (the βs in 
equation (1)) are not presented to conserve space, though in all cases I used 
a fourth-order polynomial consistent with Lee (2008). The constant term 
describes the average value for the dependent variable at the left-hand limit.
Recall that the sample sizes are smaller than the full dataset because the 
procedure is limited to observations within 15 percentage points of the 
discontinuity; similar results for smaller and larger bandwidths are shown in 
Table A1 in the Appendix.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 show that the effect of a woman’s victory 
on women’s voter turnout in US state legislative elections is statistically zero.
Column 4 includes state-year fixed effects to provide a more precise upper 
13 Though this is of course a weakness of the approach for disentangling the causal effects of
female officeholding and candidacy were they to exist, the null effects I find could only 
conceal a positive effect of one of these variables if there were in fact an equally large 
negative causal effect of the other.
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bound on the estimated effect of a woman’s victory on women’s voter 
turnout.
With fixed effects, the model implies with 95% confidence that the 
effect of a woman’s election on women’s voter turnout in subsequent 
elections is most likely zero and, at most, not more than 2.8 percentage 
points. The Imbens and Lemieux (2008) estimator (which is more efficient 
than polynomials and thus has smaller standard errors; see Table A1) 
similarly estimates with 95% confidence that women’s voter turnout does 
not rise by more than 0.9 percentage points because of a woman’s election. 
To put this latter estimate in substantive context, the mobilizing effect of 
being represented by a woman on women’s turnout thus appears to be, at 
the most, even smaller than approximately 1 percentage point mobilizing 
effect of receiving a simple ‘civic duty’ GOTV postcard in the mail (Gerber 
and Green 2000)). This upper bound is also nearly an order of magnitude 
smaller than the estimated effect of being asked to vote face-to-face or 
being sent a ‘social pressure’ mailer (Gerber and Green 2000; Gerber, Green,
and Larimer 2008). In summary, the results show that the effect of being 
represented by a female state legislator or having a female state legislative 
candidate on the ballot on women’s voter turnout in the US is statistically 
and substantively zero.14
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
Panel (a) of Figure 3 displays these results graphically, with the data 
binned in 0.5-percentage-point wide bins and the model estimated in Column
14 Including lagged dependent variables only increases statistical precision slightly because 
patterns in off-year and on-year elections within districts are not highly prognostic of each 
other. In no cases does including a lagged dependent variable meaningfully alter the results.
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3 of Table 1 superimposed. The X axis refers to women’s share of the two-
candidate vote in election 1, and the Y axis to women’s voter turnout in 
election 2. The dark line shows the fitted values from the model on each side
of the discontinuity. The vertical red line divides cases where women just 
won elections at Time 1 from those where women had just lost. If there were 
a large causal effect of electing women on other women’s participation, 
women’s voter turnout should increase for the observations just to the right 
of the vertical red line. As is clear from the raw data, there is no significant 
increase in women’s voter turnout in districts where a woman has just won 
the previous election instead of having just lost.
Women’s Share of the Electorate
Voter turnout may not be the best proxy for women’s empowerment, 
however: raw turnout statistics do not take into account effects that 
women’s victories may have on men’s turnout, and so it is also important to 
understand whether women represent a greater share of the electorate 
relative to men. The last two columns thus estimate the effect of a woman’s 
victory on women’s share of the electorate – that is, the proportion of all 
votes cast that were cast by women. The results again imply that the effect 
of electing a woman is statistically zero: furthermore, the estimates imply 
with 95% confidence that women make up no more than 0.9 percentage 
points more of the electorate due to a woman’s victory in the previous 
election. The raw data and fitted model shown in Panel (b) of Figure 3 makes
this null result similarly clear. The election of women does not appear to be 
able to meaningfully increase women’s presence in the electorate.
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Table A1 in the Appendix shows that the results presented in this 
section are robust to a number of alternative bandwidths and consistent 
when using the bandwidth and estimation procedure recommended by 
Imbens and Lemieux (2008). Even when considering data only very near the 
discontinuity or including much more data, the estimates remain essentially 
identical and never approach statistical significance.
In summary, the results indicate that there are at best minimal causal 
effects of women’s seeking and holding office on women’s political 
participation in the electorate in US state legislative elections. Though by 
their nature no statistical procedures can establish that the effects of one 
variable on another are truly zero, the null estimates reached here are 
precise enough to rule out all but substantively minimal effects. Although 
there is an extremely strong correlative association between women’s voter 
turnout and the performance of female candidates (indeed, in this data, the 
association between women’s voter turnout and women’s performance at 
the ballot box has a t-statistic of over 18), the regression discontinuity 
approach reveals that the election of women to local legislatures does not 
play a causal role in this association in the US as it does in India (Deininger 
et al. 2013). Underlying barriers to women’s participation that effect both 
women’s officeholding and women’s voter turnout appear more responsible 
for this association in the US.
Do Female Politicians Break Glass Ceilings for Other Women To Run?
District Distance Criteria: Where Can One Woman’s Victory Be Expected To 
Cause Other Women To Run?
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Though the election of women does not appear to cause more women 
to vote, can the election of one woman cause other women to run for (and 
win) office in other areas nearby? If party leaders or individual women learn 
from or are inspired by women’s victories or subsequent service in office, 
women might be more likely to run for and win offices in other districts in 
their area as a result (as Beaman et al. 2009 and Bhavnani 2009 document 
in India).
To test such hypotheses, I specify the following equation:
FemaleCandidatesNearbyiå
ElectionsNearbyå i
=a +b1Vi +b2V2i +b3V3i +b4V4i +gFi +b5ViFi +b6V2iFi +b7V3iFi +b8V4iFi +ei
 (2)  
where the left hand side describes the proportion of elections with 
female candidates in other districts near district i at Time 2 (with Time 2 
again referring to whenever the next election is held in district i), the other 
parameters refer to the election results in district i at Time 1 and are the 
same as in equation (1), and where γ now captures the causal effect of 
electing a woman in district i at Time 1 on whether other women run for 
office in districts nearby district i at Time 2.
I employ two different criteria to define ‘nearby’ districts – first, by the 
centroid distance measurement procedure described in the previous section 
and shown in Figure 2, I consider whether a woman was a candidate in or 
won all elections in other districts within 75 miles of each district, and, 
second, estimate the same quantities for elections in the 10 other districts 
closest to each district. The latter approach may help balance out spatial 
irregularities across areas: some states have larger districts than others, 
some districts are larger than others, and some districts are so rural (such as
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that for northern Alaska) that there are no others within even 100 miles of its
center. In all cases I only consider effects on elections for seats in the same 
chamber and the same state, though the results are the same when 
considering the effects on all districts.
Results: Successful Female Candidacies Do Not Generate More Female 
Candidacies Nearby
The first two columns of Table 2 and panels (a) and (c) of Figure 4 
show the estimates for the effect of a woman’s victory on the likelihood that 
a woman appears on the general election ballot in nearby districts in 
subsequent elections. Panel (a) and the first column of Table 2 show these 
estimates within the context of all districts within 75 miles, and Panel (c) and
the second column of Table 2 show them for the 10 closest district to each 
districts. In each case the results are statistically zero; there is at most a 
negligible effect of electing one woman on the likelihood that other women 
run for office. As with the panels in Figure 3, Figure 4 shows the raw data 
binned in 0.5-percentage point wide bins with the fitted model 
superimposed. It is especially clear from the Figure that the effects of 
electing a women on other women’s candidacies are essentially zero.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
Substantively, this null result is especially stark in comparison to the 
effect of other factors on women’s candidacies. While the 95% confidence 
interval from the Imbens and Lemieux (2008) (in Table A1) procedure 
estimates that women in the 10 closest districts are at most 2 percentage 
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points more likely to run for office as a result of a woman’s victory, Fox and 
Lawless (2010) find from their survey of likely candidates for office that 
women are about 37 percentage points more likely to seriously consider 
running for office when asked to do so by a political gatekeeper. Likewise, 
Fox and Lawless (2005) estimate that women are up to 55 percentage points
more likely to seriously consider running for office if they view themselves as
more qualified, an estimate that again far outstrips even the most optimistic 
estimate for the impact of witnessing other women’s victories.
Results: Female Victories
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2 show that the estimates for the effect of 
electing a women on the share of subsequent elections nearby where women
win office is likewise statistically zero. This demonstrates that the previous 
null result does not belie a quality effect whereby more talented women 
might run, increasing women’s victories even though candidacy rates 
remained the same. Rather, in other districts nearby, women are at most a 
few percentage points more likely to win office as a result of a woman’s 
victory in the previous election nearby; panels (b) and (d) in Figure 4 display 
this null result graphically.
The results are identical when considering upper chamber elections 
only, the effect of upper chamber elections on lower chamber elections, open
seat elections only, and in districts both above and below the mean state 
legislative district size. Table A1 in the Appendix shows that the results also 
continue to hold with a number of different distance criteria, including in a 
smaller and larger geographic radius and a greater and fewer number of 
27
nearby districts included. Table A1 additionally demonstrates that these 
estimates remain robust to a number of different bandwidth choices and are 
identical when using the Imbens and Lemieux (2008) estimation procedure.
In summary, the results consistently find that the election of a woman 
in one district is expected to increase the likelihood that a woman runs for 
office in a nearby district by at most a few percentage points and most likely 
not at all. Women face numerous barriers to office in the United States; 
however, the presence of other women in office itself appears unlikely to 
erode them.
Evaluating Potential Obstacles to Internal and External Validity
Can Sorting Explain The Null Results?
The estimates presented in the previous sections turn on the 
assumption that women actually win and lose elections “near-randomly” at 
the discontinuity. Though the assumptions of the design do not require that 
there are no differences between districts where women tend to lose and win
overall, they do require that there are no differences at the theoretical limit; 
that is, that parties and candidates are not so adept at manipulating 
elections that near-winners tend to have systematic advantages over near-
losers. If parties and groups can forecast campaigns’ expected vote shares 
with a high enough degree of precision, more powerful actors may be able to
focus their resources intensely on races where they might otherwise just lose
(or reverse an election result in legal wrangling afterwards), leading to a 
systematic bias where more powerful parties and groups tend to be 
overrepresented right on the winning side of the discontinuity.
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Caughey and Sekhon (2011) provide evidence that such a bias exists 
in US House elections, with parties that just win these contests much more 
likely to have had access to significant financial and other resources than 
near-losers. In this paper’s case, were such a bias to exist in US state 
legislative elections it would likely tilt the results toward uncovering a false 
positive effect and thus is unlikely to be of concern. However, as these 
authors note, a strength of the RD design is that this identifying assumption 
can be tested, and I do so to further ensure the robustness of the results. To 
do so, I conduct a placebo test estimating the ‘effect’ of a woman winning 
one contest on women’s voter turnout and the likelihood that women had 
been nominated for or won other contests nearby at the same time. We 
know that there can be no causal effect of a woman’s victory on other 
women’s nominations and victories at the very same time; therefore, if this 
placebo procedure were to find significant effects it would be of great 
concern.
 [FIGURE 5]
Figure 5 shows the results of these placebo tests, using the same 
specifications as in Tables 1 and 2 yet replacing these dependent variables 
with the same measures calculated during the same year. Reassuringly, the 
tests correctly estimate that there is no causal effect of female candidates’ 
victories on other events that have occurred simultaneously: the estimates 
never approach statistical significance and are essentially identical in size to 
the coefficients estimated for differences in these variables Time 2. The 
design’s assumptions appear to hold well, granting further confidence to the 
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null results.
External Validity
The regression discontinuity approach outlined here has substantial 
advantages over other potential approaches, but the broader implications of 
the result must be interpreted with care. This paper’s RDD estimates a local 
average treatment effects in two senses – the estimates are specific to the 
kind of races that occur near the discontinuity, and, in this paper’s case case,
to the kind of areas where women tend to oppose men in general elections in
the first place. Both of these points deserve careful consideration.
First, the design estimates the causal effect specific to the kinds of 
races that occur near the threshold – in this case, very competitive elections.
As described in Section 2, however, it is after these very close elections that 
scholars usually expect the hypothesized effects to be greatest. As noted, it 
may well be, however, that positive effects still do exist in places where 
women are seldom chosen to participate in competitive elections, such as in 
India. 
In addition, the necessity of restricting the analysis to elections where 
the candidates were of the opposite gender somewhat limits the 
generalizability of the results to the sorts of areas where women already 
tend to be nominated for offices that they can plausibly win (i.e. where they 
are not merely ‘sacrificial lambs’). On the one hand, focusing on these races 
underscores the theoretical argument that, in polities (like the US) where 
many women already hold office there are limited participatory externalities 
to the election of additional female officeholders – the existing biases against
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women’s participation in these areas go beyond what their elections can 
erode alone. Thus the results do not suggest that the election of women can 
never empower women – such an effect clearly exists in India – but merely 
that it is unlikely to do so in polities like the United States where female 
candidates and officeholding is not uncommon.
With this caveat stated, one way to evaluate the wider generalizability 
of the results in light of these restrictions is by estimating the discontinuity 
only in the subset of the data from areas where few other women hold office 
nearby. Reassuringly, doing so yields the same results – even in the 
subsamples that feature the least amount of existing female descriptive 
representation, the effects remain statistically zero.
Last, although these results about state legislatures have importance 
in and of themselves, there is some question about whether they would 
generalize to contexts such as Congressional races. However, Burns et al. 
(2001, p. 102) find that women are just as likely to know who their state 
legislators are as they are their Member of Congress, suggesting that the 
statistical precision available at the state level also comes with a relatively 
strong degree of external validity. Though more work will be needed to 
understand the degree to which this effect generalizes to other kinds of 
elections, existing data do not support the concern that potentially 
empowered women are simply ignorant that they are represented by women
in their state legislatures.
In summary, these state legislative elections bear a strong 
resemblance to the key cases of interest the literature has identified, both in 
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women’s awareness of them and in their competitiveness. Moreover, the 
results also hold even in areas of the United States where few women 
currently serve. Though research using data from one context can never 
definitely establish its generalizability elsewhere, most aspects of this 
context bear strong resemblance to others. Future scholars should, however,
seek to replicate these results in other contexts. The design described in this
paper offers a way to do so with greater precision and less opportunities for 
bias.15
Conclusion
Reflecting hopes about what the growing presence of women in 
government might herald for women’s political participation and presence in 
government – and thus for women’s substantive representation – Burns et al.
(2001, p. 9) write that “when women are in an environment where women 
seek and hold visible public offices, they are more politically interested and 
informed, and [gender] disparities in psychological orientations to politics 
shrink.” Numerous scholars, policymakers, and activists have mounted 
arguments like these about the causal effect of women’s descriptive 
representation, recently buoyed by a bevy of new findings from India 
demonstrating that the election of women to local legislatures can have a 
number of empowering effects for other women’s participation in politics at 
both the mass and elite levels. Nevertheless, empirical results in the United 
States have been mixed (Haynes 1997; Lawless 2004; Dolan 2006b), while 
scarce data and the strictly observational nature of existing approaches have
15 One intriguing possibility consistent with this result is the hypothesis offered by Atkeson 
and Carrillo (2007) that collective descriptive representation, but not dyadic descriptive 
representation, causes women’s participation to increase. The approach taken in this paper 
can only speak to the effects of dyadic descriptive representation.
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posed significant methodological barriers.
In this paper I shed new light on whether the presence of female 
politicians and candidates has such effects in the United States with a 
regression discontinuity analysis and data describing thousands of state 
legislative elections where a man opposed a woman.
First, the results uncovered no meaningful causal effect of electing 
additional women in the US on other women’s voter turnout. These 
estimates are statistically zero and precise enough to rule out effects even 
smaller than those yielded by the receipt of a simple GOTV postcard (Gerber 
and Green 2000). Although scholars and practitioners alike have expressed 
optimism that the election of more women might increase women’s 
participation in politics at the mass level, these results imply that these gains
appear to have been fully realized in the United States and that other means 
will thus be necessary to further promote women’s participation.
In addition, the results showed that a woman’s victory in one district 
has no meaningful causal effect on the likelihood that other women run for or
win office in other nearby districts in subsequent elections. These null 
estimates were also statistically precise, and implied that the effect of 
electing women on other women’s candidacies in their area is, at most, more
than an order of magnitude smaller than other scholars’ estimates for the 
effect of a woman being asked by a party leader to run for office (Fox and 
Lawless 2010). Despite the existence of associations between these 
outcomes and women’s candidacies and victories, the election of women 
does not appear to play an important causal role in them.
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These results were robust to a number of alternative specifications, 
explanations, and robustness checks. A placebo test validated the identifying
assumptions of the design, while the competitive state legislative elections 
described bear strong similarity to competitive elections featuring female 
candidates where existing literature has argued the strongest effects should 
be found. These results also hold even in areas of the United States where 
few women currently serve, even though women are just as likely to know 
who represents them in Congress as who represents them in their state 
houses.
 These findings also shed new light on the context-dependent nature of
when female officeholders can “break glass ceilings” and pave the way for 
other women to run for and win office. Exciting results from India show that 
the election of female politicians significantly decreases voters’, elites’, and 
women’s own biases against female candidates and leads to more female 
officeholding and an expanded cultural role for women there (Beaman et al. 
2009; Bhalotra et al. 2013; Bhavnani 2009; Beaman et al. 2012). This paper 
suggests that the same does not appear to be true in the United States. 
Rather, the results suggest that the biases that do continue to hold women 
from office in the US are disappointingly durable and insensitive to 
counterexample. Electing female role models appears most important for 
improving other women’s participation in government in contexts where few 
women have held office before (Gilardi 2013).
These results underscore that attention to the underlying barriers to 
women’s equal participation in politics is essential. As the election of more 
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women to office in the US appears unlikely to itself be able to meaningfully 
diminish the remaining barriers to officeholding and political participation 
that women face, efforts to elect individual women must also be 
complemented by a continuing attention to these underlying barriers (Duflo 
2012; Kanthan and Woon 2013). Careful attention to both what can and 
cannot address these challenges is necessary to achieve what equality 
demands.
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Table 1. RD Estimate of Electing a Woman on Women’s Subsequent 
Political Participation
Time Time 2
Dependent Variable Woman on
Ballot
Women’s Voter
Turnout
Female Share of
the Electorate
Woman Won At
Time 1
0.431*
*
(0.073
)
0.432*
*
(0.077
)
-0.008
(0.029
)
-0.007
(0.018
)
0.004
(0.003
)
0.004
(0.003
)
Degree of
Polynomials
4 4 4 4 4 4
State X Year FEs? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant 0.451*
*
(0.062)
n/a 0.535*
*
(0.002)
n/a 0.530*
*
(0.002)
n/a
R2 .248 .250 .007 .005 .009 .014
N 2588 2588 2588 2588 2588 2588
Notes: ** = p < .001, * = p < .10, all tests two-tailed. Bandwidth is 0.15 in all
cases. The Table shows that women are not significantly more likely to vote 
or to comprise a greater share of the electorate due to being represented by 
a woman. This is additionally surprising given that women are twice as likely 
to appear on the ballot during the next election when they win.
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Table 2. Effect of Women’s Victories on Women’s Candidacies 
Nearby
Time Time 2
Dependent Variable Female
Candidates per
Contest
Female Victors
per Contest
Distance Criteria Contes
ts
Within
75
Miles
10
Closest
Contes
ts
Contes
ts
Within
75
Miles
10
Closest
Contes
ts
Woman Won At
Time 1
0.028
(0.040
)
0.007
(0.045
)
0.021
(0.029
)
0.004
(0.032
)
Degree of
Polynomials
4 4 4 4
Constant 0.453*
(0.028)
0.468*
(0.030)
0.267*
(0.021)
0.274*
(0.022)
R2 .003 .001 .005 .002
N 2404 2433 2404 2433
Notes: * = p < .10, all tests two-tailed. Sample sizes differ slightly between 
the columns because 29 state legislative districts in the US are so remotely 
located that no other districts exist within 75 miles of their centers. The 
Table shows that women’s victories do not cause other women to run for 
office in other districts nearby. 
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Figure 1. Hypothesized “Breaking of the Glass Ceiling” Pattern
Notes: The Figure visualizes how a regression discontinuity design would 
discover the effect of a woman’s victory on other women’s candidacies in 
subsequent elections. The X-axis describes a woman’s share of the two party
vote in a district at Time 1; women won races to the right of the 
discontinuity. Even though the overall relationship is endogenous, the 
difference between the estimates of the data’s true underlying form at the 
limit captures the causal effect of electing a woman in other districts near 
district A at Time 2.
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Figure 2. District Distance Measurement Procedure Example
Notes: The Figure illustrates the procedure used to measure which other 
state legislative districts are nearby each state legislative district. The 
centroid of each district is calculated, then other districts with centroids 
within a certain distance of the master district’s centroid are identified.
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Figure 3. Effect of Women’s Victories on Women’s Voter Turnout
Notes: The circles show the data’s average values in 0.5-percentage point 
wide bins, with the size of the circles corresponding to the number of 
observations in each bin. The dark lines show the model estimated on each 
side of the discontinuity, which is shown in red. The distance between these 
lines at the discontinuity captures the causal effect of women’s elections. 
Panels (a) and (b) show that the election of a woman does not cause more 
women to vote in subsequent elections. These null results hold despite the 
increased likelihood that women will appear on the ballot in subsequent 
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elections. Female officeholding and campaigning thus do not appear to 
meaningfully increase women’s voter turnout.
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Figure 4. Effect of Women’s Victories on Other Women’s Candidacies
Nearby
Notes: The circles show the data’s average values in 0.5-percentage point 
wide bins, with the size of the circles corresponding to the number of 
observations in each bin. The dark lines show the model estimated on each 
side of the discontinuity, which is shown in red. The distance between these 
lines at the discontinuity captures the causal effect of women’s elections. 
The Panels show that women’s victories in one district do not cause more 
women to run for or win office in other districts nearby in subsequent 
elections.
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Figure 5. Placebo Tests for Sorting
Notes: The circles show the data’s average values in 0.5-percentage point 
wide bins, with the size of the circles corresponding to the number of 
observations in each bin. The dark lines show the model estimated on each 
side of the discontinuity, which is shown in red. The distance between these 
lines at the discontinuity captures the pre-existing differences between 
districts on each side of the discontinuity. As expected, there are no 
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significant pre-existing differences between districts on each side of the 
discontinuity.
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Table A1. Results for Alternate Bandwidths and Geographic Areas
Specification 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 Imbens
/
Lemieu
x
Dependent 
Variable
Women’s Voter 
Turnout
0.030
(0.052)
0.015
(0.036)
0.008
(0.029)
0.004
(0.025)
0.008
(0.022)
-0.011
(0.010)
Women’s Share 
of the Electorate
0.004
(0.005)
0.004
(0.003)
0.004
(0.003)
0.003
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
Woman on 
Ballot Next Year
0.435***
(0.121)
0.390*
**
(0.089)
0.431*
**
(0.073)
0.411*
**
(0.049)
0.414*
**
(0.059)
0.408*
**
(0.032)
Candidates/
Contests, 5 
Closest Contests
-0.061
(0.096)
0.059
(0.072)
0.030
(0.059)
0.031
(0.051)
0.040
(0.046)
0.012
(0.022)
Victories/
Contests,  5 
Closest Contests
-0.061
(0.072)
0.010
(0.053)
-0.010
(0.043)
0.005
(0.038)
0.017
(0.034)
-0.000
(0.015)
Candidates/
Contests, 10 
Closest Contests
0.030
(0.078)
0.004
(0.055)
0.007
(0.045)
-0.007
(0.039)
0.002
(0.035)
-0.007
(0.018)
Victories/
Contests, 10 
Closest Contests
0.005
(0.054)
0.009
(0.039)
0.004
(0.032)
-0.001
(0.028)
0.002
(0.025)
-0.003
(0.012)
Candidates/
Contests, 15 
Closest Contests
0.027
(0.063)
0.018
(0.046)
0.029
(0.038)
0.019
(0.033)
0.015
(0.030)
-0.010
(0.016)
Victories/
Contests, 15 
Closest Contests
0.016
(0.068)
0.014
(0.032)
0.015
(0.026)
0.007
(0.022)
0.001
(0.021)
-0.009
(0.010)
Candidates/
Contests, within 
50 Miles
0.019
(0.068)
0.002
(0.054)
0.018
(0.045)
0.026
(0.040)
0.028
(0.036)
-0.005
(0.019)
Victories/
Contests, within 
50 Miles
0.036
(0.045)
0.002
(0.036)
-0.014
(0.032)
-0.005
(0.027)
-0.002
(0.025)
-0.017
(0.012)
Candidates/
Contests, within 
75 Miles
0.036
(0.061)
0.010
(0.047)
0.028
(0.040)
0.023
(0.036)
0.012
(0.033)
-0.002
(0.014)
Victories/
Contests, within 
75 Miles
0.013
(0.040)
0.004
(0.032)
0.021
(0.029)
0.021
(0.025)
0.013
(0.023)
-0.001
(0.012)
Candidates/
Contests, within 
100 Miles
0.035
(0.060)
0.008
(0.043)
0.026
(0.036)
0.027
(0.032)
0.020
(0.029)
0.003
(0.013)
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Victories/
Contests, within 
100 Miles
0.028
(0.038)
0.008
(0.029)
0.024
(0.025)
0.028
(0.022)
0.018
(0.020)
0.003
(0.010)
Notes: *** = p < .01. * = p < .10. The Table shows that the null estimates 
hold using a variety of other geographic distance criteria and bandwidth 
criteria. The bandwidth refers to the window of observations used for 
estimating the underlying model; for example, a bandwidth of 0.15 means 
that only observations where a female candidate captured between 35% and
65% of the two-candidate vote are included.
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